Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor by Watts, Amanda
Constructing the Past
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 11
2014
Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy
Leading to Pearl Harbor
Amanda Watts
Illinois Wesleyan University, awatts@iwu.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History Department at Digital Commons @ IWU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Constructing the Past by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ IWU. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Watts, Amanda (2014) "Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor," Constructing the Past:
Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 11.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol15/iss1/11
Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor
Abstract
Joseph Clark Grew was the American ambassador to Japan in years leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. This
article attempts to uncover Grew's role as a diplomat in Japan during these turbulent years.
Keywords
Joseph Grew, American ambassador, Japan, Pearl Harbor
Acknowledgements
Thank you to Dr. Mike Young for all his assistance developing this paper.
This article is available in Constructing the Past: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/constructing/vol15/iss1/11
 62
Joseph Grew and American-Japanese Diplomacy Leading to Pearl Harbor 
Amanda Watts 
 
Joseph Clark Grew served as the American ambassador in Japan 
throughout the ten years preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. On January 27, 
1941, Grew sent a telegram to Washington warning, “There is a lot of talk around 
town to the effect that the Japanese, in case of a break with the United States, are 
planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor.”1 Yet during the 
time that elapsed between Grew’s warning and the actual outbreak of hostilities, 
Grew remained in Japan, pursuing different avenues of diplomacy to avert an “all-
out, do or die attempt, actually risking national hara-kiri,” by the Japanese 
engaging in a war they were doomed to lose.2  Waldo Heinrichs, Grew’s lone 
biographer, claims that because Ambassador Grew continued to view diplomacy 
as "personal relationships," and harbored ambitions to carve a name for himself in 
history, he lost "decisive influence with his government," and was therefore 
rendered an ineffective diplomat in Japan during the crucial months leading up to 
the attack on Pearl Harbor.3 I will seek to weigh these claims against other 
scholarly sources, which portray Ambassador Grew as a perceptive diplomat who 
desperately sought to mend relations between the United States and Japan when 
faced with policy makers who “maintained a static, rigid, and unchangeable 
image of the situation.”4 In this paper, I attempt to sift through a montage of 
primary and secondary sources supporting these divergent perspectives in an 
endeavor to discover the most accurate version of the truth. Ultimately, I reach the 
conclusion that Grew is neither a shining example of the pinnacle of diplomacy, 
nor a cautionary tale of an inept aristocrat. The difficulty in ascertaining the 
“truth” of the matter made Keith Jenkins’s postmodernist approach more 
appealing, but I maintain that, through a close scrutiny of the available sources, it 
is possible to reach a more informed truth, if not absolute. Joseph Grew was 
simply an American diplomat who had moments of brilliance supplemented by a 
passion for golf and the desire for personal glorification, but reaching the truth of 
the matter was more trying and time-consuming than I had anticipated. 
 A significant portion of circumstances surrounding Grew’s experience can 
be reasonably established as true. David Gaddis, one of America’s leading 
diplomatic historians, confirms that Ambassador Grew was informed by Ricardo 
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Rivera-Schreiber, the Peruvian ambassador to Japan, of an attack on the “U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, in the central Pacific, by using aircraft,” and subsequently informed 
the United States government.5 Heinrichs elaborates that as America increased its 
support for the Nationalist regime led by Chiang Kai-Shek, who resisted Japanese 
aggression in China, relations became further strained.6 These tensions were 
magnified by American discomfort with Japan’s continued imperialist expansion 
under the thin guise of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Robert 
Fearey, Grew’s private secretary, writes that Grew ultimately came to place his 
faith in facilitating a conference between Japanese Prime Minister Konoye and 
President Franklin Roosevelt to “fundamentally turn U.S.-Japan relations around 
before it was too late.”7 Though the idea initially “caught the President’s 
imagination,” and Roosevelt considered a convenient meeting location, the notion 
quickly fell out of favor in Washington.8 Intriguingly, Paul Schroeder, an 
American historian and professor at the University of Illinois, believes, “The one 
obstacle that the Japanese were never able to overcome was the deep-seated 
distrust and suspicion of Secretary [of State Cordell] Hull,” who “used his 
considerable influence to throw cold water on the scheme.”9 Hull urged a pre-
settlement agreement with four principles, which would “effectively torpedo the 
conference,” due to Konoye’s risk of assassination if the radical elements in the 
Japanese government caught wind of the negotiations before Konoye could secure 
the support of the Emperor and the Japanese public.10 Though Grew continued 
efforts to facilitate a leadership conference, these efforts proved to be in vain. 
Scholars seem to accept all these facts as accurate assessments of the situation 
surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 
 Conflicting pictures of Ambassador Grew emerge when expounding upon 
this narrative. To a degree, Grew displayed characteristics of an aristocratic 
diplomat equally as concerned with leisure as with labor. Some sources seem to 
believe that his ineptitude may have been to blame for his inability to persuade 
Roosevelt to engage in face-to-face negotiations. Heinrichs deems Grew’s 
enthusiasm for the leaders’ meeting “an unprofessional reaction,” because “The 
function of diplomacy is to discover areas of agreement in confidence,” which is 
complicated when heads of state become involved.11 Heinrichs attributes this to 
Grew’s concept of professionalism: “diplomacy was for him essentially a matter 
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of personal relationships, the intercourse of nations being governed best by the 
code of gentlemanly conduct. Diplomacy retained an aristocratic flavor.”12 
Grew’s attitude toward diplomacy is perhaps best understood by taking into 
context the circumstances in which he first became involved in ambassadorial 
affairs. Time magazine published an article detailing Grew’s rise to ambassadorial 
status. After graduating from Harvard, Grew planned to return to his family’s 
banking business, but while traveling in China, “he shot a tiger in a cave” which 
“enthralled” President Theodore Roosevelt.13 On his trip, Grew became fond of 
life abroad and “decided to enter the foreign service,” as a clerk at the U.S. 
embassy in Cairo.14 When Teddy Roosevelt heard about the “tiger-slaying 
exploit,” he cried, “By Jove! I’ll have to do something for that young man.”15 
Within hours, Grew was appointed third secretary of the embassy in Mexico 
City.16  
Grew appeared to take personal connections into consideration when 
hiring his own staff as well. Robert Fearey, in recounting his year in Japan as the 
ambassador’s private secretary, revealed significant aspects of Grew’s actions 
through seemingly menial commentary. Upon first meeting the ambassador, 
Fearey noted that Grew had “just received a letter,” from Fearey’s “grandfather, 
Bishop William Lawrence,” who had confirmed Grew at Groton.17 When Mrs. 
Grew entered, she lamented that, unlike his predecessor, Fearey did not play 
bridge.18 Fearey’s account also reveals the importance golf played in Grew’s 
diplomacy. Not only did golf play an integral role in the daily activities of the 
ambassador during the tumultuous period, but Fearey outright states, “I had 
known that one of my principal duties would be golf.”19 Golf evidently played a 
large role in Grew’s diplomacy, or lack thereof, and a large portion of Fearey’s 
account is dedicated to recounting golfing outings. Heinrichs concurs that, even 
after being presented with Japan’s notice “breaking off [diplomatic] 
conversations,” Grew returned to the Embassy “intending to change clothes for a 
game of golf, only to hear first news that Japan and his country were in armed 
conflict” as of earlier that morning.20 Following the outbreak of hostilities, Grew 
and his staff, along with other Americans in Tokyo, were interned for several 
months until the governments arranged for the return of diplomats. This 
experience traumatized Grew, and in his later speeches he recounted the tales of 
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torture others had told him. However upsetting this ordeal was, Grew still 
managed to keep a detailed account of his golfing activities. On the fourth of 
January, 1942, the first line in Grew’s journal entry boasts, “Made my first hole in 
one on our Embassy golf course,” and Grew proceeds to describe the course.21 
Grew’s sufferings seem to be exaggerated. 
Another question brought to light by Fearey’s account is the notion of a 
report Grew compiled, yet has never been published.  Fearey recalls that during 
the internment in Japan, Grew worked on a report to Hull and Roosevelt 
presenting his views on “Washington’s mishandling of the pre-Pearl Harbor 
negotiations.”22 Fearey summarizes the main points of Grew’s report, but the 
accuracy of his rendition is highly questionable. Fearey states, “Although it is 50 
years since I studied and made suggestions on Grew’s internment report, and I 
kept no notes, I believe the above is an accurate rendition of what I read.”23 This 
ignorant statement severely undermines the credibility of Fearey’s entire account, 
and suggests that Fearey’s memories should probably be taken as mere 
reminiscences, and nothing more. Fearey remarks that the report “would seem to 
add to the strength of Grew’s case that the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting should 
have been held,” and appears puzzled by its mysterious disappearance.24 Upon his 
return to the United States, Grew delivered many speeches with fervent patriotic 
rhetoric appealing to American passions. Personally, I think Grew may have 
buried the report in order to promote unity in a time of crisis. Still, this mention of 
an unpublished, unknown report compiled while being held in Japan during 
World War II raises many questions about what else Grew may have concealed 
from the public. 
Additionally, Grew seems to have been influenced by the prospect of 
securing his legacy. Evident in his speeches and published documents are 
conspicuous attempts to paint himself as champion of peaceful relations, a 
negotiator between unyielding interests. Heinrichs claims that Grew could hardly 
resist the opportunity to attend a “successful summit conference averting war,” 
which would be “the crowning moment of a mission, a career, the perfect last 
chapter.”25 These excerpts, taken in conjunction, evidence a leisurely lifestyle of a 
pompous aristocrat more concerned with improving his putting than international 
relations. 
This evidence seems to contradict the notion that Joseph Grew was truly a 
talented ambassador dedicated to the avoidance of war between Japan and the 
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United States. Yet many sources reached precisely that conclusion. Time 
magazine maintains that, “above all else, Grew was a precise and accurate 
diplomatic reporter.”26 On what authority this assertion is founded remains 
unclear, but other sources seem to sympathize with Grew as well. Roberta 
Wohlstetter, a prestigious American military intelligence historian, commends 
Grew for “Extremely competent on-the-spot economic and political analysis,” 
calling Grew a “most sensitive and accurate observer.”27 Additionally, Abraham 
Ben-Zvi, who wrote his doctoral dissertation,  “American Preconceptions and 
Policies toward Japan,” for the University of Chicago, places the blame on policy 
makers such as Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Cordell Hull, who were 
“doctrinaire, dogmatic, and rigid in their convictions. . . unwilling to consider any 
view which was different from their own – even when the ‘different views’ were 
expressed with vigor and vehemence by an experienced diplomat like the 
American ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph C. Grew.”28 Ben-Zvi categorizes the 
former men as “globalist-realists” who “perceived American national interests in 
the Far East as but one element within a wider context,” and therefore focused on 
American opposition as “essential to the preservation of the European and Pacific 
balance of power.”29 Ben-Zvi contrasts this group with the “nationalist-
pragmatists,” which include Grew and Roosevelt as men who focused on the 
“maintenance and protection of American interests,” and were well aware of the 
tremendous burden of a “two-ocean war.”30 Ben-Zvi points to these differing 
priorities as the prime source of dissonance between the policy makers. 
Perhaps, then, Heinrichs is correct, and Grew’s shortcomings as an 
ambassador can be more accurately perceived as the result of his lack of influence 
within his own government.  Yet if he was ideologically aligned with Roosevelt, 
Grew should have had more success in facilitating a leaders’ meeting.  The 
deficiency of Ambassador Grew’s power within the American government is 
plainly evident in his self-compiled diplomatic record, Turbulent Era.  
Throughout the book, Grew’s frustration becomes increasingly apparent as his 
advice continued to fall on deaf ears. He titled one section, “Recommendation for 
Speech by President Unheeded,” and describes how he attempted to convince 
Roosevelt to prepare a speech outlining benefits to the Japanese if they were to 
settle with the United States.31 Grew chronicles another failure under the subtitle, 
“Another Recommendation Unheeded,” referring to his suggestion to warn the 
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Japanese “in advance that certain economic sanctions will be imposed if [bases in 
Indochina] are taken.”32Again indicating his sensitivity to future accounts of the 
events, Grew notes that “History will wish to know,” why his recommendation 
was not carried out.33 
Grew’s lack of persuasion may be connected to what some scholars deem 
to be unwarranted optimism. Heinrichs notes that “Grew tended to a more hopeful 
view of things than circumstances warranted,” and his attitude seemed “more 
imaginative, positive, and resilient than that of his government.”34 Schroeder 
points out that in late November, Hull presented an “uncompromising” proposal 
which convinced the Japanese “beyond all doubt that settlement was 
impossible.”35 Yet, Heinrichs notes, in a “burst of sheer wishful thinking,” Grew 
threw his support behind it.36 Grew’s desperation to seize any agreement worked 
to discredit everything he endorsed.  Schroeder notes, “Grew was undoubtedly 
over-optimistic,” concurring with Heinrichs’s view.37 Gordon Prange, an expert 
on Pearl Harbor and Chief Historian for General Douglas MacArthur after World 
War II, believes Grew “overestimated his expertise about the Japanese scene,” 
and “could visualize only beneficial results” from the meeting because he was 
such a romantic aristocrat.38 
The ultimate failure for the leaders’ conference to materialize was a 
colossal disappointment for Grew. Though some sources attribute Grew’s lack of 
influence in the American government to his excessive optimism, there is also 
evidence that indicates the Japanese were hoping to reconcile with the U.S., 
which may refute the conception of Grew as an incompetent ambassador. The 
Foreign Minister told Grew that “the personnel of the Prime Minister’s suite, 
including full admirals and generals, have been confidentially appointed and the 
ship to carry the party has been put into momentary readiness to sail,” once the 
United States confirmed the conference.39 The Japanese had not only prepared to 
depart for the conference; Konoye had also indicated that he “wholeheartedly” 
agreed with Hull’s four principles for “rehabilitation of relations.”40 Hull had 
required the Japanese agree to four principles before meeting: “respect for 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, equality 
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of commercial opportunity, and peaceful procedures.”41 In fact, Konoye secretly 
“invited Grew to dine to convey his personal assurances” that he accepted Hull’s 
preconditions and that he would be able to carry out an agreement reached at the 
meeting.42 Konoye’s willingness to make any preliminary agreements at all is 
indicative of his eagerness to negotiate, because he was risking assassination if 
the radical elements in Japan heard of the talks.  
Grew’s attempts to salvage the relations between Japan and the United 
States leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor attest to his value as an effective 
ambassador. However, these efforts must be examined, bearing in mind Grew’s 
biases and desires. Constantly reminding the reader that “the verdict must be left 
to history,” Grew demonstrated his hypersensitivity to how events would be 
retroactively judged. 43 Ultimately, I have reached the conclusion that despite his 
flaws, Ambassador Grew did genuinely strive to revive relations between the 
United States and Japan. His unwarranted optimism undermined his influence in 
his home government, and he was often distracted by golf, but his attempt to 
initiate a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye had real potential. Scholars 
cannot reach a consensus on Grew’s overall effectiveness, and this is mainly 
attributable to the obscurity of the truth. The truth, in this instance, was masked 
both unintentionally and purposefully. Although the research proved to be much 
more extensive than I expected, I retain my original view on historical truth. If I 
had more time, I would be able to ascertain much more of the truth; unfortunately, 
I had far more sources than I had time. I would have liked to explore in much 
more detail what happened to the report Grew supposedly compiled while in 
internment, as well as the events of December seventh in Japan. Intriguingly, 
Grew requested an audience with the emperor after receiving a telegram from 
Roosevelt, but all he received was a notice breaking off diplomatic relations while 
the strike on Pearl Harbor was in motion.44  
Ultimately, I believe Joseph Grew was a diplomat who desperately wanted 
to reconcile the governments of Japan and the United States for political as well 
as personal reasons. He retained an archaic attitude toward the nature of 
diplomacy, and enjoyed the luxuries associated with that mentality. Grew’s 
ludicrous optimism eroded the foundation of his influence with the American 
government, which ultimately compromised his diplomacy. Grew certainly was 
no martyr, but he was no imbecile either. A good portion of the blame may lie 
within the American government and beyond Grew’s reach. Scholars may debate 
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for centuries Grew’s effectiveness as a diplomat, but it seems unlikely they will 
ever reach a unanimous verdict. This is cause for Keith Jenkins to gloat. However, 
with more dedicated researchers like Heinrichs, a better understanding of the past 
will continue to evolve. 
 
 
